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Abstract: The allocation rules for phase one EU ETS emissions permits demonstrates that 
energy generators were lobbying winners because they successfully blocked differential 
treatment (rules) from energy intensive industries, who cannot pass-on real or nominal costs of 
permits to consumers. As a result, these generators benefited from windfall profits. In phase 
three, the reverse is true; energy intensive industries successfully established differential rules. 
These rules will provide energy intensive industries with free allocations while most generators 
will be subject to 100 per cent auctioning, thus removing the windfall profit mechanism for 
generators. Literature applying public choice theory to this case study predicted free permit 
allocations but not windfall profits for generators nor the change in allocation rules in phase 
three. This paper presents the argument that a shift in Wilson’s Typology from client to 
interest group politics best explains these changes and provides a good framework for other 
jurisdictions considering emissions trading reforms. This dynamism in Wilson’s Typology is 
demonstrated by comparing the positions of industry associations representing energy 
generators and energy intensive industries with the two directives before and after 
consultations, which facilitates the identification of lobbying winners and losers. The EU ETS 
case study is fertile ground for testing regulatory theories that explain shifts away from 
clientelist policies with high levels of rent-seeking and towards more optimal policy 
equilibriums. This paper provides both a theoretical framework and empirical evidence for 
how emissions trading policy can be improved, despite rent-seeking, once it clears the 
legislative hurdle.   
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PART ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
Emissions trading (ET) is an important regulatory instrument to address climate 
change because it is said to be efficient, effective, and equitable.1 While all three 
claims are subject to criticism, this paper uses the European Emissions Trading 
Scheme’s (ETS) regulatory failures as a case study because it is the first of its kind 
and provides valuable policy lessons for ET programs elsewhere.2  Specifically, 
industry lobbying for free European Union Allowances (EUA) in phase one (2005-
2007) and phase two (2008-2012) has been criticised for creating windfall profits 
benefiting electricity generators (generators) and raising electricity prices for both 
domestic consumers and energy intensive industries (EIIs). However, phase three 
(2013-2020) allocation rules require 100 per cent auctioning for most generators 
and free permits for some EIIs.  
Table Two below explains that phases one and two were the product of the 
same directive and consultation process. Phase one is now complete which 
provides a rich source of empirical evidence and academic literature. Phase three, 
however, was subject to a separate directive and consultation process. References 
to phases one and three throughout this paper also refer to their enabling 
directives unless otherwise specifically stated. 
The puzzle is: what explains the change in permit allocation rules between 
ETS phases one and three? In particular, as actor preferences have not significantly 
changed and most private interest theories of regulation predict the static 
dominance of producer interests at the expense of diffuse cost-bearing publics, 
why did this shift take place?  
This paper will argue that Wilson’s politics of regulation Typology is more 
applicable to EU policymaking than private interest theories and that, within EU 
policymaking, a shift has taken place that is consistent with a movement that 
Wilson would typify as a change from client politics to interest group politics.3 
This Wilsonian shift usefully explains the change in EUA allocation rules between 
ETS phases one and three.  
The ETS is an interesting case study because it demonstrates the possibility of 
policy shifts that can be captured within the terms of Wilson’s Typology. Such 
changes, moreover, can be tracked evidentially. The ETS consultation process for 
phases one and three directives was transparent. All lobbying positions are 
available on the EU Commission’s (commission) website.  EURELECTRIC 
represented generators in both phases. EIIs lobbied mainly individually in phase 
one, but formed the Alliance of Energy Intensive Industries (AEII) in phase three.  
                                                     
1 N. Stern, Blueprint for a Safer Planet: How to Manage Climate Change and Create a New Era of Progress and 
Prosperity (London: The Bodley Head, 2009). 
2 R. Baldwin, ‘Regulation Lite: The Rise of Emissions Trading’ (2008) 2 Law and Financial Markets Review 
3, 262.  Regulatory failures are defined as: ‘a regulation with a purpose to improve the world but which 
fails to produce a net benefit to society’ in C. Sunstein, ‘Paradoxes of the Regulatory State’ (1990) 57 
University of Chicago Law Review 407, 412.   
3 J.Q. Wilson, The Politics of Regulation (New York: Basic Books, 1980). 
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Comparing the positions of these associations with the original commission 
proposals and final directives in both phases allows, with certain assumptions, for 
the identification of lobbying winners and losers.  The results of this analysis will 
then be matched with Wilson’s typological descriptions to show that his theory 
provides a better explanation for the change in allocation rules.  
As Wilson predicted greatest rent-seeking with client politics, conclusions will 
assess the prospects of ETS reflecting optimal policy prescriptions.4   These 
conclusions may be of significance to policymakers designing American, 
Australian, and global ET schemes.   
 
 
 
PART TWO: UNDERSTANDING ALLOCATIONS 
 
Relatively few scholars have applied private interest theories to ET schemes, and 
even fewer have used Wilson’s Typology. The literature also struggles to explain 
changes in allocation rules between phases.  Although some scholars apply 
Wilson’s Typology to analyse American SO2 trading and ETS phase one, to date 
none have applied Wilson’s Typology to phase three’s final EUA allocation; instead 
the policy change between ETS phases have been explained using EU policymaking 
theories not Wilson’s more universal typology that considers the distribution of 
regulatory costs and benefits.5 Also, while a number of authors have explained free 
over-allocation of EUAs in phase one, none predicted the windfall profits of 
generators nor considered potential changes in allocation methods after 2012.6  
This section will assess the relevance of private interest theories to this topic, 
particularly their applicability to EU policymaking and their ability to explain 
                                                     
4  See section ‘What prospects for phase three?’ below. 
5 P.L. Joskow and R. Schmalensee, ‘The Political Economy of Market-Based Environmental Policy: The 
U.S. Acid Rain Program’ (1998) 41 Journal of Law and Economics 37; L. Heinzerling, ‘Selling Pollution, 
Forcing Democracy’ (1995) 14 Stanford Environmental Law Journal 300; B.J. Cook, ‘The Politics of 
Allowance Allocation in Emissions Trading Systems: Implications for Climate Change Policy Design’ 
(unpublished working paper, 2009) 1.  For ETS phase three, J. Wettestad, ‘EU Energy-Intensive 
Industries and Emissions trading: Losers Becoming Winners’ (2009) 19 Environmental Policy and Governance 
309, the author analysed the phase three commission proposal, not the final directive, but in a separate 
join publication did consider the final directive, see J. B. Skjoerseth and Jorgen Wettestad, ‘The EU 
Emissions Trading System Revised (Directive 2009/29/EC)’ in S. Oberthur and M. Pallemaerts (eds), The 
New Climate Policies of the European Union: Internal Legislation and Climate Diplomacy (Brussels: Brussels 
University Press, 2010) 65-93. However, in both cases the authors do not use Wilson’s Typology, instead 
they analyze changes between directives using EU policymaking theories such as liberal 
intergovernmentalism and multi-level governance. Wilson’s Typology is much more transferable to 
explaining policy decisions in other liberal democracies because it is a general theory with no specific 
application to jurisdictions unlike EU theories. 
6 J.T. Boom, ‘Interest Group Preference for Instruments of Environmental Policy: An Overview’ in C. 
Bohringer, M. Finus, and C. Vogt. (eds), Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory, 
and Public Choice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2002); P. Markussen and G. T. Svendsen, ‘Industry 
Lobbying and the Political Economy of GHG Trade in the European Union’ (2005) 33 Energy Policy; G.T. 
Svendsen, ‘Lobbying and CO2 Trade in the EU’ in  B. Hansjurgens (ed), Emissions Trading for Climate 
Policy: US and European Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).  
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regulatory change. The case will then be made for using Wilson’s approach 
instead.  
 
PRIVATE INTEREST THEORIES AND EMISSIONS TRADING 
 
Private interest theories and the policymaking process 
Private interest theories all highlight the risks of capture caused by information 
asymmetry and revolving door career paths.7  While modern versions of these 
theories now explain business preference for ET, historically they predicted the 
dominance of command and control regulation.8 Both analyses point to potential 
rent-seeking with either instrument resulting from Hayek’s ‘knowledge problem’ 
of insurmountable informational asymmetries.9  More recently, scholars have 
signalled the importance of market-based instruments (MBI) like carbon taxes or 
ET to reduce this asymmetry and discourage ‘revolving door’ career paths that 
contribute to capture. By choosing ET instead of best available technology 
mandates, or cap and trade systems rather than baseline and credit approaches, 
asymmetry and the potential for capture is reduced.10 Despite the theoretical 
foundations of various private interest approaches, there exists little empirical 
evidence to support either capture or revolving-door careers.11 Government 
failure has also been criticised as a myth.12  
There are two dominant schools of private interest theories, each with 
different assumptions about actor motivation.  The Chicago school of law and 
economics believes legislators and regulators seek to maximise their personal 
wealth.  Virginian public choice scholars assume that in addition to financial 
interests, these actors are motivated by electoral and ideological gains. In both 
models, regulatees seek to extract rents (excess profits) caused by government 
intervention in the economy (eg limiting competition by awarding monopolies or 
creating other barriers to market entry).13  Despite the strong empirical evidence 
for private interest theories, they have been criticised for a lack of applicability to 
EU policymaking and a failure to adequately explain policy change. 
 
                                                     
7 Defined as when: ‘vested interests bias the incentives of regulators and governments to act in their 
interests rather than the broader public interest’. See D. Helm, ‘Regulatory Reform, Capture and the 
Regulatory Burden’ (2006) 22(2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 169. 
8 n 6 above; J.M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, ‘Polluters' Profit and Political Response: Direct Control vs. 
Taxes’ (1975) 65(1) The American Economic Review 139. 
9 n 2 above; F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty : A New Statement of the Liberal Principles of Justice and 
Political Economy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1982); G. Tullock, ‘The Welfare Coasts of Tariffs, 
Monopolies, and Theft’ (1967) 5 Western Economic Journal 224. Hayek’s critique of central planning is 
conceptually different from public choice, because it does not assume policymakers are motivated by self-
interest.  See M. Pennington, Planning and the Political Market: Public Choice and the Politics of Government 
Failure (London: Athlone, 2000) 11. 
10 n 2 above, 263; n 7 above, 180. 
11 E. Bo, ‘Regulatory Capture: A Review’ (2006) 22(2) Oxford Review of Economic Policy 203, 215. 
12 P.J., Boettke, C.J. Coyne, et al, ‘Saving Government Failure Theory from Itself: Recasting Political 
Economy from an Austrian perspective’ (2007) 18 Constitutional Political Economy 127, 135. 
13 R. Baldwin and M. Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1999) 22. 
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The limits of private interest theories  
1. EU policymaking  
Foster reveals the challenges of applying Chicagoan and Virginian theories to EU 
policymaking through his analysis of network industry ownership in Britain.14 In 
rejecting a Chicagoan explanation for nationalisation, he describes the centrality of 
pork-barrel lobbying to Chicagoan models.15 The Chicagoan approach is therefore 
more applicable to political systems like America with liberal campaign finance 
laws, weak political parties, and first-past the post-electoral systems, a combination 
rarely found in Europe.16 Following an intergovernmentalist approach to EU 
policymaking, member states, and therefore European institutions, are less 
exposed to Chicagoan arguments.17 For example, the EU Parliament (parliament) 
cannot initiate legislation and is elected by proportional representation, and other 
EU institutions are not directly elected. Parliament also operates by consensus 
through transnational groupings and is therefore less exposed to capture in the 
Chicagoan sense.18 This likely explains why parliament has always favoured EUA 
auctioning.19   
At first glance, Virginian explanations are more convincing. However, 
following a supranationalist argument, the commission dominates and is the locus 
for most lobbying activity, although the plurality of EU institutions allows lobbyists 
to venue shop and should not be regarded as monolithic.20 Nevertheless, the EU 
policymaking dynamic is different to congressional or parliamentary systems 
because the powerful commission seeks neither electoral nor ideological gains in 
the Virginian sense because it is an unelected bureaucracy. The commission is 
arguably motivated less by ideology than by Brussels empire-building, 
jurisdictional expansionism, and budget maximisation through regulation.21  
Authors have highlighted the growth and domination of interest group activity by 
corporate interests in Brussels and how the commission gives insider status to 
business and funds groups – non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – that 
provide informational support for its agenda of European integration.22 This 
                                                     
14 C. Foster, ‘Rival Explanations of Public Ownership, Its Failure and Privatization’ (1994) 72(4) Public 
Administration 489. 
15 ibid, 497. 
16 C. Hood, Explaining Economic Policy Reversals (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994) 26. 
17 A. Moravcsik, ‘Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist 
Approach’ (1993) 31(4) Journal of Common Market Studies 473; A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe. Social 
Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht (London: Routledge, 1998). 
18 A. Michaelowa, ‘Impact of Interest Groups on EU Climate Policy’ (1998) 8 European Environment 152, 
157. 
19 Markussen and Svendsen, n 6 above, 253. 
20 G. Majone, ‘The Rise of the Regulatory State in Europe’ (1994) 17(3) West European Politics 77, 85; G.T. 
Svendsen, The Political Economy of the European Union: Institutions, Policy and Economic Growth (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2003) 66; for an illustration of EU institutions as arenas of power see Skjoerseth and 
Wettestad, n 5 above, 65-93. 
21 Svendsen, ibid, 131; for an illustration of EU policymaking theories that demonstrate this see 
Skjoerseth and Wettestad, ibid, 65-93. 
22 For example, ibid, 93; Svendsen, n 6 above, 154, where the author posits that centralised policymaking 
at the commission makes lobbying cheaper than more fragmented polities like America. See, also, C. 
Mahoney, ‘The Power of Institutions State and Interest Group Activity in the European Union’ (2004) 
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provides a severe challenge to private interest theories because it reverses the 
direction of capture. Part Four will discuss evidence of this in ETS phase three. 
2. Explaining policy change  
The Chicago school struggles to explain policy change more than other regulatory 
theories.23 If regulation is a function of client politics (see Table One), then what 
explains policy reversals that reduce rents like full EUA auctioning?24  While 
Chicagoans such as Peltzman, Keeler, and Noll have argued that endogenous 
processes of ‘rent dissipation’ cause shifts to deregulation, evidence of this 
phenomenon is patchy.25 In addition, no risk of windfall profit dissipation exists 
for generators because the industry is not exposed to global competition. Virginian 
theories better explain change because the utility functions of politicians are 
broader; they are motivated by ideological gains and shifting voter preferences.26  
Therefore, electoral backlashes (against producer dominance) or ‘new ideas’ are 
endogenous to Virginian theory and can explain deregulation.27 While other 
regulatory theories such as pluralism and institutionalism are important to 
understand policy dynamism, a discussion of them is beyond the scope of this 
paper. Instead, the following analysis will consider the dominant literature: public 
choice application to ETS phase one.28  
 
Public choice application to emissions trading 
Most literature applies public choice to ET because it reveals the risks of regulatory 
failure. Unless planners have sufficient incentives to act on and acquire the 
necessary information to correct market failures, it is a ‘nirvana fallacy’ to assume 
that politics can fix markets.29 Political markets are mired with transaction costs 
and collective action problems that generate client politics equilibriums.30 The 
rational ignorance of voters provides little incentive for monitoring or mobilising 
                                                                                                                                       
5(4) European Union Politics 441, 443; D. Coen, ‘Empirical and Theoretical Studies in EU Lobbying’ (2007) 
14(3) Journal of European Public Policy 333, 341; M. Braun, ‘The Evolution of Emissions Trading in the 
European Union-The Role of Policy Networks, Knowledge and Policy Entrepreneurs’ (2008) Accounting, 
Organisations and Society (doi:10.1016/j.aos.2008.06.002). 
23 n 16 above, 27. 
24 K. Neuhoff and F.C. Matthes ‘The Role of Auctions in Emissions Trading’ (Climate Strategies 
Working Paper, Cambridge, UK: Climate Strategies, 2008) 4. 
25 S. Peltzman, ‘The Economic Theory of Regulation after a Decade of Deregulation’ (Brookings Papers 
on Economic Activity, Washington: Microeconomics, 1989); T. Keeler, ‘Theories of Regulation and the 
Deregulation Movement’ (1984) 44(1) Public Choice 103; R.G. Noll, ‘Economic Perspectives on the 
Politics of Regulation’ in R. Schmalensee and R.D. Willig (eds), Handbook of Industrial Organisation (New 
York: Elsevier, 1989); n 16 above, 32. 
26 This is strength rather than a weakness in terms of loss of predictive power which Baldwin and Cave 
argue, n 13 above, 25.  
27 Keeler, n 25 above, 130; n 14 above, 501. 
28 A.S. MacFarlane, ‘Interest Groups and Political Time: Cycles in America’ (1991) 21(3) British Journal of 
Political Science 257; M. Schneiberg, ‘Combining New Institutionalisms: Explaining Institutional Change in 
American Property Insurance’ (2005) 20(1) Sociological Forum 93.  
29 H. Demsetz, ‘Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint’ (1969) 12 Journal of Law and Economics 1, 
1; Pennington, n 9 above, 7. 
30 Pennington, ibid, 17. 
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against rent-seeking by small, wealthy, organised lobby groups.31 Politicians and 
bureaucrats are monopolists in their domains and have strong incentives to make 
short-term gains through rent distribution and to empire-build with clientelist 
coalitions.32 Such has been the strength of rent-seeking in both America and 
Australia that ET programs have failed to clear legislative hurdles in both countries 
(see the section on Policy implications below). Indeed, America has abandoned 
the more efficient economy-wide cap and trade program in favour of a sectoral 
approach, with ET primarily for electric utilities; and even the legislative success of 
this proposal is uncertain.33  
Public choice literature defines the self-interests of large emitters (large 
electricity generators, EIIs), politicians, environmental NGOs (ENGOs), and 
bureaucrats in a consistent way.  Generally speaking, large emitters are profit 
maximisers with goals to minimise climate policy costs and/or gain additional 
rents. This explains their preference for ET compared to carbon taxes.34 Within 
this group, large electricity producers in Europe and America favour 
grandfathered permits.35 Elected politicians (parliament and council) are assumed 
to be risk-averse opportunists with a primary objective of re-election.36  ENGOs 
have historically focused on targets and not policy instruments because they raise 
funds through easily understandable campaigns.37 However, significant literature 
exists analysing the preference and opposition of ENGOs to MBIs and ET in 
particular.38 Bureaucrats (commission) prefer instruments that allow discretionary 
decisions, require negotiation and are based on special information needs.  This 
allows them to empire-build by budget-raising, to link climate policy with other 
growth areas, and to play a central role in implementation.39 It also demonstrates a 
bias towards the conservatism of command and control regulation.40 These 
defined interests allow public choice theory to identify whether groups are winners 
or losers in political markets. Markussen and Svenden identified winners and 
                                                     
31 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1965); I. Somin, ‘Voter Ignorance and the Democratic Ideal’ (1998) 12(4) Critical Review 413. 
32 J.M. Buchanan and G. Tullock, The Calculus of Consent : Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy (Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962). 
33 US Congress-Senate. American Power Act. Discussion Draft. 111th Cong., 2nd  sess. (May 2010) 1-987 at  
http://kerry.senate.gov/americanpoweract/pdf/APAbill.pdf (last visited 15 May 2010).  
34 n 2 above, 264. 
35 G.T. Svendsen, Public Choice and Environmental Regulation: Tradable Permit Systems in the United States and 
CO2 Taxation in Europe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1998) 119. 
36 Boom, n 6 above, 220. 
37 n 18 above, 158. 
38 S. Kelman, What Price Incentives? Economists and the Environment (Boston, Mass.: Auburn House, 1981); 
N.O. Keohane, R.L. Revesz, et al, ‘The Positive Political Economy of Instrument Choice in 
Environmental Policy’ (Discussion Paper  97-25, Washington D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1997); B.R. 
Dijkstra, The Political Economy of Environmental Policy: A Public Choice Approach to Market Instruments 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1999); Svendsen, n 35 above. 
39 n 18 above, 156; Svendsen, n 20 above, 107. 
40 Boom, n 6 above, 235. 
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losers for Directive one, while Wettestad did so for Commission Proposal Two (see 
Table Two for details of these documents).41 
With these interests in mind, public choice theory has made a number of 
predictions that have been confirmed by empirical evidence to explain why ET is 
counterproductive and deviates from economic prescriptions.42  For example, 
public choice predicts that the preferences of small, powerful, cohesive industry 
lobbies will be reflected in permit allocation rules (free grandfathering) and 
abatement levels (lower). Empirically, the American SO2 trading scheme and the 
ETS evidenced this phenomenon.43 At an international level, business preferences 
are reflected in the Kyoto Protocol Joint Implementation and Clean Development 
Mechanism.44 The large gap between the ambition of international agreements and 
the reality of domestic implementation can also be explained by the relatively 
greater strength of climate protection interests at the international level.45 Finally, 
the divergence between mandatory ET legislation in Europe and America or 
Australia can be partly explained by the commission’s self-interest in 
institutionalising the ETS.46  
While these failures cannot be disputed, ETS phase three is an improvement 
on phase one. Public choice struggles to explain this phenomenon because actor 
preferences have not significantly changed (see Case Study Analysis below). The 
commission always favoured auctioning, and industry always preferred free 
permits. Even while EIIs objected to generator windfall profits they favoured free 
allocation for themselves and demanded compensation for higher energy prices. 
EURELECTRIC also begrudgingly accepted auctioning in phase three (see Table Six 
in Appendix One). Wilson’s Typology and derived literature provide a better 
                                                     
41 Markussen and Svendsen, n 6 above; Wettestad, n 5 above; see also Skjoerseth and Wettestad, n 5 
above, 65-93, for a discussion of how EU theories explain allocation rule changes in the ETS. 
42 R.W. Hahn, ‘Economic Prescriptions for Environmental Problems: How the Patient Followed the 
Doctor's Orders’ (1989) 3(2) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 95; P. Grabovsky, ‘Counterproductive 
Regulation’ (1995) 23 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 347. 
43 Heinzerling, n 5 above; Joskow and Schamalensee, n 5 above; N. Anger, C. Bohringer, et al, ‘Public 
Interest vs. Interest Groups: Allowance Allocation in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme’ (ZEW 
Discussion Paper No 08-023, Mannheim, Germany: Center for European Economic Research, 2008); H. 
Tschochochei and J. Zockler, ‘Business and Emissions Trading from a Public Choice Perspective-Waiting 
for a New Paradigm to Emerge’ in R. Antes, B. Hansjurgens, and P. Lamathe (eds), Emissions Trading: 
Institutional Design, Decision Making and Corporate Strategies (New York: Springer, 2008). 
44 J.T. Boom and G.T. Svendsen, ‘The Political Economy of International Emissions Trading Choice: 
Empirical Evidence’ (Discussion Paper 00-19, Copenhagen: Institute of Economics, University of 
Copenhagen, 2000); R. Falkner, Business Power and Conflict in International Environmental Politics (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 122. 
45 n 18 above; Falkner, ibid; A. Michaelowa ‘Climate Policy and Interest Groups-A Public Choice 
Analysis’ (1998) November/December Intereconomics 251. 
46  Svendsen, n 20 above; J.A. Layzner, ‘Deep Freeze: How Business has Shaped the Global Warming 
Debate in Congress’ in M.E. Kraft and S. Kamienieck (eds), Business and Environmental Policy: Corporate 
Interests in the American Political System (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2007); M. McKenzie, ‘Lessons for 
Australia from the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme’ (2008) 5 Macquarie Journal of International 
Comparative Environmental Law 115.  For a good analysis of how business preferences in Washington and 
Brussels led to different policy outcomes, see Braun, n 22 above; C. Egenhofer, ‘The Making of the EU 
Emissions Trading: Scheme: Status, Prospects and Implications for Business’ (2007) 25(6) European 
Management Journal 453. 
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analytical framework for explaining different allocation rules. This last discussion 
will complete the literature review.  
 
WILSON’S TYPOLOGY  
 
Wilson’s Typology is a political rather than economic explanation for regulation. It 
complements public choice theory by providing a profile for successful rent-
seeking groups instead of simply assuming regulation is demanded and obtained.47 
Wilson’s theory does not explain how benefits materialise because unlike 
Virginians and Chicagoans, Wilson ignores the consideration for regulatory 
bargains.48 The Typology therefore suffers from a critique of generality, but is also 
more applicable to EU policymaking.  The essence of Wilson’s argument is that the 
distribution of regulatory costs and benefits is central to predicting rent-seeking 
levels. Wilson’s Typology also provides roles for policy entrepreneurs, force of 
ideas, and other political explanations for regulatory change, because costs and 
benefits are not exclusively monetary. The importance of economic interests 
differs throughout Wilson’s theory.49    
Wilson’s Typology describes four politics of regulation.  When benefits of 
regulation are concentrated and costs are dispersed, client politics (the Chicagoan 
original sin) emerges with very high levels of rent-seeking because cost-bearers 
face high barriers to collective action due to group size.50 The general public (often 
cost-bearers) may not be aware of clientelist regulation because negotiations are 
usually opaque. However, NGOs are now important checks on this phenomenon. 
Less favourable conditions for rent-seeking are expected in the following 
three circumstances. Firstly, when costs and benefits of regulation are 
concentrated, interest group politics emerges, meaning that regulation will benefit 
one group at the expense of another. Each side has an incentive to organise and 
exercise political influence with less rent-seeking resulting. While the public may 
sympathise with one group over another, its voice only is heard in general terms. 
In the second circumstance, costs and benefits are both dispersed, and all or most 
of society expects to both gain and pay. As such, both opponents and proponents 
of regulation may find it difficult to organise. A majoritarian politics will therefore 
emerge only when popular sentiment and elite opinions are convinced of 
regulatory benefits. Lastly, entrepreneurial politics occurs when the benefits of 
regulation are dispersed but the costs are concentrated. In this situation, 
opponents have strong incentives to block regulation. Yet even Wilson observed 
how policy entrepreneurs can mobilise latent public support despite collective 
action challenges. Table One illustrates Wilson’s Typology with examples:51  
 
                                                     
47 n 16 above, 24; n 13 above, 24. 
48 Noll, n 25 above, 1277. 
49 n 3 above, 361-372. 
50 Olson, n 31 above.  
51 n 3 above, 365-372. 
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Table One: Wilson’s typology – the politics of regulation52 
 
Costs of Regulation Benefits of 
Regulation Concentrated Dispersed 
Concentrated Interest Group Politics 
 
Example:  rail freight rate 
regulation 
 
Client Politics 
 
Example: restrictions on 
imports 
Dispersed Entrepreneurial Politics 
 
Example: restrictions on tobacco 
sales 
Majoritarian Politics 
 
Example: public smoking 
bans 
 
Wilson’s typology and emissions trading 
To the author’s knowledge, only three articles analyse ET regimes with Wilson’s 
Typology and none compare changes between ETS phases one and three.53 Joskow 
and Shmalensee concluded that free allocations in the American SO2 trading 
scheme generated majoritarian politics because costs and benefits were widely 
distributed instead of weighted toward narrow economic or geographical 
interests.54 A majoritarian equilibrium is synonymous with climate policy goals 
which: (1) internalise carbon costs so that they are borne by all carbon-intensive 
consumers; and (2) spread the benefits of climate stability widely. Patashnick 
draws the same conclusions to theorise why such general interest reforms are 
sustained. 55 However, both these analyses overlook how ET works in practice; 
some firms profited by passing-on costs while others could not. Cook’s working 
paper instead characterises the SO2 trading program as interest group politics 
because the final legislation pleased each affected party.56 His analysis also finds 
evidence of interest group politics in ETS phase one because industries received 
free EUAs and competed for both exclusion and lower abatement targets. 
However, Cook does not address the issue of generator windfall profits in phase 
one, nor does his analysis extend to phase three which requires full auctioning for 
generators and free permits for most EIIs.57 Part Four below explains how these 
omissions are important counter-arguments to Cook’s characterisation of phase 
                                                     
52 Source: Adapted from Hood, n 16 above, 25. 
53 See n 5 above. 
54 n 5 above, 70, 81. 
55 E.M. Patashnik, Reforms at Risk: What Happens After Major Policy Changes are Enacted (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2008) 153-154.  General interest reforms are defined by Patashnik on page 2 as ‘non-
incremental change of an existing line of policymaking intended to rationalize governmental undertakings 
or to distribute benefits to some broad constituency’. Therefore Patashnik’s conception is very similar to Wilson’s 
entrepreneurial and majoritarian politics.  
56 n 5 above, 13. 
57 ibid, 16. 
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one. This supports the paper’s hypothesis that phase one was an example of client 
not interest group politics.   
 
Explaining regulatory change using Wilson’s typology 
Wilson’s Typology adds to existing ETS public choice literature because it better 
explains changes across phases.  By recasting Svendsen and Cook’s work in terms 
of client politics and analysing recent scholarship by Wettestad, Skjoerseth 
andGullberg, who use EU theories to demonstrate that EIIs won in phase three, 
valuable insights can be gained.58 This paper will apply Wilson’s Typology to both 
final ETS directives to explain different EUA allocation rules. 
Wilson provides little explanation for shifts in his typology except for the 
possibility of entrepreneurial politics. He believes policy entrepreneurs are 
facilitated by crises and by the discovery of electoral ore from regulation that 
benefits scattered groups at the expense of narrow ones.59  Keeler, Bendor, and 
Moe make this argument to explain deregulation.60 However, Wilson is unclear as 
to whether entrepreneurial politics means blank slate regulation (new) or changes 
to regulation formed in client or interest politics equilibriums to reflect a new 
alignment of costs and benefits.  His rather static view of cost-benefit distribution 
suggests the former, and therefore Wilson does not explain how regulation 
escapes the iron grip of client politics.  
A small but fascinating body of scholarship develops Wilson’s Typology to 
explain these changes; some of which was canvassed above (see Explaining policy 
change). Hood divides the literature between exogenous (force of ideas) and 
endogenous (interest group) explanations, although as discussed above, ideas are 
not necessarily exogenous to Wilson’s model.  For example, the very prescriptive 
success of Chicagoan theories may have undermined their descriptive accuracy 
through exogenous new ideas (regulatory failure) which facilitated shifts from 
client to entrepreneurial politics.61 Adding to Peltzman and Keeler’s endogenous 
arguments analysed above, Hood describes a ‘lose-to-win’ strategy adopted by 
AT&T in accepting deregulation for access to new markets.62 Also, counter-
mobilisation occurred when corporate consumers lobbied for deregulation of 
telecommunications markets to lower costs and compete with other financial 
centres. However, Hood explains that counter-mobilisation cuts both ways and 
                                                     
58 Svendsen, n 20 above; Svendsen n 6 above; ibid; Wettestad, n 5 above; Skjoerseth and Wettestad, n 5 
above, 65-93; A.T. Gullberg, ‘The European Electricity Sector and the EU ETS Review’ (CICERO 
Working Paper 2008:01, Oslo: Center for International Climate and Environmental Research, 2008). 
59 Policy entrepreneurs are characterised as: well-educated, understanding complex ideas, having high 
social status and opinion-leadership. See J. Black, ‘Tomorrow's Worlds: Frameworks for Understanding 
Regulatory Innovation’ in J. Black, M. Lodge, and M. Thatcher (eds), Regulatory Innovation: A Comparative 
Analysis (North Hampton, MA: Edward Elgar, 2005) 18-20; n 3 above, 370-371. 
60 Keeler, n 25 above, 130; J. Bendor and T. M. Moe, ‘An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic Politics’ (1985) 
79(3) The American Political Science Review 755, 768. 
61 n 16 above, 28-29; M. Derthick and P.J. Quirk,  The Politics of Deregulation (Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution, 1985) 
62 n 25 above; n 16 above, 30. 
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can cause a shift back from entrepreneurial to client politics.63 The tendency of 
client politics to self-destruct may also explain shifts to interest group 
equilibriums, although very little literature explores this point. The case study 
analysis in Part Four below explores this self-destructive pattern in the ETS.  
New scholarship provides explanations for the rise and sustainability of 
general interest reforms.64 Patashnik surveys the literature and outlines three 
conditions for adoption: (1) policy entrepreneurs must lower information costs to 
mass publics by linking reform solutions to salient issues (eg by linking ET to GHG 
mitigation policy); (2) reform proponents must adopt procedural strategies to 
weaken the organisational advantages of narrow groups (eg by developing expert 
knowledge or changing committees structures); and lastly (3) reform advocates 
must use tactical concessions to neutralise political opposition (eg by providing 
free permits).65  Patashnik then argues that general interest reforms are most 
resilient when they upset coalitional patterns and stimulate the emergence of new 
vested interests and political alliances. This last point is significant because one of 
the advantages of ET compared to carbon taxes is that the former is easier to 
implement politically because policymakers can pay-off opponents and create new 
political constituencies that have a stake in ET programs.66 However, somewhat 
paradoxically, this virtue can be a vice if rent-seeking is so strong that stakeholders 
lose faith in ET, resulting in a failure to implement in the first place. This 
phenomenon is currently being observed in both America and Australia. 
In light of the literature, this paper addresses the following puzzle: what 
explains the different EUA allocation rules for generators and EIIs between ETS 
phases one and three? The proposed and tested hypothesis is: a shift can be seen 
in Wilson’s Typology, as one from client politics to interest group politics.  This 
shift explains the change in allocation rules. 
 
 
 
PART THREE: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE EU ETS 
 
The ETS is the cornerstone of EU climate policy. Launched in 2005, it is the first 
cross-border greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) trading scheme and regulates more 
than 11,500 installations or about 45 per cent of total EU CO2 emissions.67 Phase 
one ran from 2005 to 2007, while phase two runs from 2008-2012. The EU 
directive (Directive One) that enabled both these phases fell under the co-decision 
                                                     
63 n 16 above, 33. 
64 See n 55 above. 
65 ibid, ch 2. 
66 ibid, 144; J.P. Voß, ‘Innovation Processes in Governance: The Development of ‘Emissions Trading’ as 
a New Policy Instrument’ (2008) 34(5) Science and Public Policy 329, 338; n 2 above. For example, carbon 
markets create a powerful and rapidly growing set of vested financial interests with strong incentives to 
lobby for the continuation of the ETS.  Also, ring-fencing auctioning revenues for renewable energy 
projects create new political constituencies. 
67 Egenhofer, n 46 above, 453. 
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mechanism and entered into force on 13 October 2003.68 It was legislated after the 
Council of Ministers (council) unanimously modified Commission Directive One, 
along with a very large majority in parliament.69  
 
Directive One was the result of rigorous commission consultations with 
stakeholders.  The Green Paper provided the reference for this. In only a few cases 
did the commission express explicit preferences (see Table Six below in Appendix 
One). The commission’s main preference, as expressed in the Green Paper, was for 
a centralized allocation process to provide a level playing field between countries. 
It also appears that the commission preferred auctioning as a method of EUA 
allocation. However, after critical responses from industry and Member States, 
such as Germany and the U.K., Commission Directive One proposed a free 
decentralized EUA allocation process which was incorporated into Directive One.70  
 
Phase three of the ETS (2013-2020)  was triggered by Directive One Article 30 which 
required that the commission submit a report to parliament and council before 
extending the directive after the Kyoto Protocol expires (phase three: 2013-
2020).71 The report assessed ETS performance and concluded the need for a 
review.  This gave rise to a number of position papers and studies by stakeholders 
with further consultations within the European Climate Change Program (ECCP). 
The ECCP established a working group on the review and produced final reports 
incorporated into a commission communication.72  Membership of the working 
group was comprised of member states, industry, NGOs, academia, and research 
institutes. These consultations formed the basis of a second commission directive 
(Commission Directive Two). 73 It was modified into Directive Two, which was adopted 
unanimously by the council with only 60 votes against and 29 abstentions in 
parliament. 74 Directive Two entered into force on 5 June 2009. Table Two provides 
a legislative timeline. 
                                                     
68 Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2003/87, Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Allowance Trading Within the Community and Amending Council Directive 96/61/EC [2003] OJ 
L275/32. 
69 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading with the Community and 
Amending Council Directive 91/61/EC’ COM (2001) 581 final, 23 October 2001; Egenhofer, n 46 
above, 454. 
70 Commission (EC), ‘Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Within the European Union’ (Green Paper) 
COM (2000) 87 final, 3 March 2000; Skjoerseth and Wettestad, n 5 above. 
71 Commission (EC), ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, 
the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee for the Regions: Building a Global 
Carbon Market –Report Pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 2003/87/EC’ (Communication) COM (2006) 
676 final, 13 November 2006. 
72 ibid. 
73 Commission (EC), ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending 
Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading 
System of the Community’ (Communication) COM (2008) 16 final, 23 December 2008.           
74 Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2009/29 amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Improve 
and Extend the Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Scheme of the Community [2009] OJ 
L140/63; Euractiv.com, ‘Mixed Reactions as Parliament Approves EU Climate Deal’ (18 December 
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Table Two: EU ETS legislative history   
 
Green Paper (2000) 
Green Paper Consultation (2000)75 
Commission Directive One (2001) 
Phase one 
(2005-2007)  
 
Phase two  
(2008-2012) 
Directive One (2003) 
Commission Report to Parliament and Council pursuant to Art. 30 of 
Directive one (2006)76 
Commission Report Consultations (2007)77 
Commission Directive Two (2008) 
Phase 
three 
(2013-2020) 
Directive Two (2009) 
 
The main features of Directive One and Directive Two is briefly summarized as 
follows and are listed in Tables Six and Seven (Appendix One). Directive One 
proposes a decentralized system, where Member States play a critical role in 
deciding the amount and allocation of EUAs and the commission acts as watchdog 
to ensure compliance with agreed upon allocation criteria. The EU regional cap is 
therefore the sum of all national caps. EUAs are primarily handed out for free and 
the scope of sectors and GHGs covered is narrow. Directive One also allows credits 
to be imported from third countries through Kyoto’s Clean Development 
Mechanism.  Directive Two, on the other hand, is much more centralized.  It has 
done away with national allocation plans and introduced more GHGs and sectors.  
Most importantly, it has adopted auctioning of EUAs as the general principle from 
which exceptions are made. Restrictive rules on importing credits from third 
countries are also incorporated.  
 
Multiple purposes prevent labelling ETS phase one an overall regulatory failure.  
ETS phase one was a trial period with a goal to ensure European leadership 
promoting global cost-effective climate policy instruments.78 This leadership 
component has been accomplished; however, a complete regulatory success would 
                                                                                                                                       
2008) at  http://www.euractiv.com/en/climate-change/mixed-reactions-parliament-approves-eu-climate-
deal/article-178163 (last visited 20 May 2010). 
75 DG Environment, ‘Answers to Green Paper from National Governments, Business, Business 
Associations and NGOs’ (2000) at http://ec.europa.eu/environment/docum/0087_en.htm (last visited 
May 20, 2010). 
76 Commission (EC), ‘Building a Global Carbon Market – Report Pursuant to Article 30 of Directive 
2003/87/EC’ (Communication) COM (2006) 676 final, 13 November 2006. 
77 DG Environment, ‘Emission Trading System (EU ETS) Stakeholders' Contributions for the Review 
Process of the EU ETS (publication subject to agreement)’ (2007) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/list_review.htm (last visited 20 May 2010). 
78 A.D. Ellerman and P.L. Joskow ‘The European Union's Emissions Trading System in Perspective’ 
(2008) May Policy 1. 
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have resulted in the absence of both windfall profits and over-allocation.79   This is 
significant because ETS phase three will not require 100 per cent EUA auctioning. 
The potential for regulatory failure still exists. As a result, many commentators 
propose a carbon tax as an alternative policy tool because it is less susceptible to 
rent-seeking and provides price stability.80 The next section presents the evidence 
to identify winners and losers in both ETS phases.  
 
EVIDENCE ANALYSED 
 
The industries analysed are limited to large electricity generators and EIIs. It is 
clear from the literature review that generators on balance won in phase one, while 
EIIs won in phase three.81 This paper seeks to explain the reasons for this change.  
The positions of individual firms and NGOs are also not analysed.82  Instead, 
the interests of large generators are reflected in EURELECTRIC’s positions. The AEII 
represented 12 energy intensive industrial sectors (most EIIs) in phase three but 
not phase one. A full list is found in Appendix Two. The AEII was created after the 
relative failure of its members’ lobbying and previous weaker umbrella groups’ 
efforts (UNICE, IFIEC) in phase one.  
The lobbying positions of EURELECTRIC and the AEII in phases one and three 
are represented in Tables Four and Five.  Table Six compares the Green Paper to 
Directive One, while Table Seven compares Commission Directive Two to Directive Two. 
Table Four illustrates the divided positions of EII members during phase one. All 
tables are found in the appendices. 
 
IDENTIFYING WINNERS AND LOSERS  
 
Adding to the findings of Markussen and Svendsen, Tables Four, Five and Six 
indicate that phase one did not produce absolute winners despite some sectors 
faring better than others.83  All industrial sectors wanted a voluntary system, which 
                                                     
79 See ibid; windfall profits occurred because very little EUA auctioning occurred in ETS phases one and 
two, and allocations were based on the historical emissions of each installation.  Energy generators 
incorporated the nominal prices of EUAs in their rates despite receiving them for free. Over-allocation 
resulted because of the decentralised allocation system which provided member states with incentives to 
protect national industries. Modest emissions targets, data constraints, and the political challenges of 
forecasting economic growth all contributed to the EUA price crash in 2006. For a detailed analysis of 
the EU ETS and European electricity markets see: A. D. Ellerman, F.J. Convery and C. De Perthius, 
Pricing Carbon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010) 293-328. 
80 n 2 above; C. Hepburn, ‘Carbon Taxes, Emissions Trading and Hybrid Schemes’ in D. Helm and C. 
Hepburn (eds), The Economics and Politics of Climate Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009); D. 
Helm, ‘The Case for Carbon Taxes’ in S. Less (ed) Greener, Cheaper (London: Policy Exchange, 2010). 
81 All interviews; Gullberg, n 58 above; Wettestad, n 5 above; EndsReport ‘Trading Down to a Low-
Carbon Economy’ (2009) 408 Ends Report 38. 
82 BP and Shell were instrumental in institutionalising the ETS because they had significant experience 
with their own internal emissions trading schemes and provided great informational resources to the 
commission. The literature review above also mentions the significance of NGOs.  See Braun, n 22 
above, 13; J.B. Skjærseth and J. Wettestad, EU Emissions Trading: Initiation, Decision-Making and 
Implementation (Aldershot.: Ashgate, 2008) 184. 
83 Markussen and Svendsen, n 6 above, 253; Skjærseth and Wettestad, ibid. 
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Directive One rejected. Only chemical and aluminium industries successfully lobbied 
for exclusion. They claimed the ETS would affect their ability to compete 
internationally. Free grandfathered EUAs are an example of cross-sectoral success 
particularly when compared to auctioning. However, the divisions of AEII 
members on this issue are glaring. It may explain their inability to oppose 
allocation and banking decisions left to member states which created the 
competitiveness problems discussed above in the first section of Part Three84 
Generators on the other hand favoured national allocations because it allowed 
consideration (ie lobbying) of national differences in reduction potential, despite 
their numerous cheap options for CO2 reductions compared to EIIs.85 Finally, by 
avoiding auctioning, generators reaped windfall profits. The fact that EIIs did not 
identify this issue, promote auctioning for generators, or obtain compensation for 
higher energy prices is further evidence that generators fared better than most EIIs 
in phase one. Markussen and Svendsen attribute this success to generators being 
the largest and most important sector for implementation.86 
Like phase one, phase three did not produce absolute winners; however, 
Table Seven demonstrates EURELECTRIC did not receive the lions’ share of 
concessions. It gained only one important victory in Directive Two – that of optional 
derogations for generators in Poland and the Baltic. This is limited to a high 
percentage of fossil fuel generation and interconnectivity with Russian energy 
alternatives (see Article 10(c) in Table Seven). Despite the apparent coup, it is not 
attributable to EURELECTRIC’s position. Instead it reflects the unique 
characteristics of these domestic energy markets and the symbolic goal of political 
unanimity at the council for Poznan Conference of the Parties (COP) 14.87 It is a 
mere ‘fig leaf’ according to one EU insider because the qualifying threshold for 
derogations is very high.88 
AEIIs on the other hand, received every concession except one – that of 
regulating electricity costs (see Table Seven). However, Directive Two, Article 10(a) 
allows member states to compensate industries for GHG cost pass-through, with 
admittedly very strict benchmarks.  This is nevertheless an improvement on 
Commission Proposal Two, which omitted the issue.  The AEIIs also improved 
Commission Proposal Two by increasing the number of small installations excluded 
                                                     
84 P.D.R. Gonzalez, ‘Implementing the EU Emissions Trading Directive in Spain: A Comparative Study 
of Corporate Concerns and Strategies in Different Industrial Sectors’ in R. Antes, B. Hansjurgens, and P. 
Letmathe (eds), Emissions Trading and Business (New York: Physica-Verlag, 2007) 311; Skjærseth and 
Wettestad, ibid, 116; EndsEurope, ‘EU Climate Policy Package Delayed’ (17 October 2001)  at 
http://www.endseurope.com/5841?referrer=search (last visited May 20, 2010).  
85 S. Varming, P. B. Eriksen, et al, ‘Tradable CO2 Permits in Danish and European Energy Policy’ (Riso-
R-1184(EN), Roskilde: Riso National Laboratory, 2000); n 78 above, 32. 
86 n 6 above, 253. 
87 Commission interviews; EndsReport, ‘Compromise EU Climate Package Hurried Through Brussels 
Summit’ (2008) 407 Ends Report 4, 4. 
88 Commission interviews. 
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from the ETS and adding a qualitative criterion to the methodology for identifying 
industries at risk of carbon leakage.89 
Wettestad and Gullberg both argue that when analysed through the lens of 
industry differentiation, it is clear that EURELECTRIC won in phase one, and AEIIs 
won in phase three.90 By differentiation, Wettestad means electricity generators 
can pass-on real or nominal costs of EUAs without risk of carbon leakage or 
displacement, while some EIIs cannot because they are exposed to global 
competition.91 
The next and final section will attempt to provide a theoretical framework for 
explaining this change in winners and losers between phases one and three using 
Wilson’s Typology. 
 
 
 
PART FOUR: CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
 
THE EXPLANATORY FORCE OF WILSON’S TYPOLOGY 
 
This paper seeks to understand: why different EUA allocations rules were adopted 
in ETS phases one and three. As addressed in Part Two above, most private 
interest theories struggle to provide an explanation of this shift because actor 
constellations and their interests have not significantly changed. Yet the ETS case 
study identified generators as lobbying winners in phase one, while EIIs won in 
phase three.  Wilson’s Typology provides an analytical lens to explain this puzzle 
which is more informative to other jurisdictions than existing scholarship based on 
EU policymaking theories. This is because Wilson’s insight, that the distribution of 
regulatory costs and benefits explain regulatory outcomes, provides a framework 
for understanding the dynamics of ET regulation beyond the EU. The hypothesis 
defended here is that a shift from client to interest group politics from phase one 
to phase three explains this change. In phase one, generators benefited more than 
EIIs, with higher overall levels of rent-seeking which resulted in an unstable 
equilibrium characteristic of client politics.  In phase three, EIIs only succeeded in 
gaining slightly more concessions, with lower overall rent-seeking levels and a 
stable stalemate indicative of interest group politics. While it is rarely the case that 
empirical realities match exact abstract typologies, the following section will 
                                                     
89 Commission interviews; Directive Two, n 74 above, Art 10(a), (c) and Annex II. Carbon leakage is 
defined in n 72 above as: ‘relocating of GHG activities from the EU to third countries, thereby increasing 
global emissions.’ Some Baltic generators are exposed to carbon leakage because of their interconnectivity 
and competition with Russian energy suppliers. They therefore cannot pass-on nominal or real EUA 
costs (interview); see also: EndsEurope, ‘Baltic States to Link up with Wider EU Grid’ (18 June 2009) at 
http://www.endseurope.com/21597?referrer=search (last visited 20 May 2010). 
90 n 5 above; n 58 above. 
91 Industry interviews; Grabovsky, n 42 above, 351; J.D.C.D. Larragan, ‘Too Much Harmonisation? An 
Analysis of the Commission's Proposal to Amend the EU ETS from the Perspective of Legal Principles’ 
in M. Faure and M. Peeters (eds), Climate Change and European Emissions' Trading: Lessons from Theory and 
Practice (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2008) 74. 
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characterize phase one as client politics by analyzing the reasons for why interest 
group politics did not emerge immediately when it had the potential to do so. This 
will be done by proposing a broader understanding of regulatory costs and 
benefits to include: transaction, informational, agency and collective action costs 
and benefits.  
On balance, evidence for phase one fits with Wilson’s description of client 
politics.  Small, well-organised generators successfully secured free EUAs and 
passed-on their nominal costs to diffused domestic consumers, generating 
significant windfall profits.  However, two facts do not neatly fit this model: (1) 
allocation rules were transparently devised; and (2) powerful EIIs could have 
ensured the emergence of interest group politics. Wilson envisaged client politics 
as one of ‘backstairs intrigue, quiet lobbying, and quick passage with a minimum 
public discussion’.92 This was not the case for the ETS legislative process. Also, 
public interest arguments about climate change mitigation are the reason for these 
directives, which Wilson believed would require ‘more elaborate justifications—
and thereby mobilize a more extensive coalition’.93 The other three politics 
envisage greater transparency or at least some public knowledge of the rents being 
lobbied for.  This is because majoritarian politics require public support for 
adoption, while entrepreneurial politics require policy entrepreneurs to mobilise 
latent public sentiment. Interest group politics expect a lukewarm public whose 
voices are heard in ‘weak or general terms’.94  Consequently, while the case study 
evidence prevents any serious characterisation of phase one as either majoritarian 
or entrepreneurial politics, it does present the following question: why did interest 
group politics not emerge in the first place?   
As discussed in Part Two, Cook has characterised phase one as interest group 
politics.95 He concludes that evidence of interest group competition fits Wilson’s 
prediction because something in the ‘final legislation please[d] each affected 
party’.96 However, resulting windfall profits for generators do not fit with lower 
rent-seeking expectations of interest group politics, nor does the fact that eventual 
ET regulatory costs are borne by all carbon-intensive consumers (not just EIIs as 
the concentrated costs of interest group politics suggests). Rather, these facts fit 
with client politics.  Also, if interest group politics emerged in phase one, why did 
the allocation rules change in phase three? This form of politics expects only 
marginal changes due to fierce competition. 
There are at least three important factors that help explain why interest group 
politics did not emerge in phase one: (1) the windfall profit mechanism was not 
widely understood or made transparent by generators; (2) EIIs were divided and 
not well-organised; and (3) the legislative process was rushed with steep learning 
curves for most involved. Each of these factors will be discussed in turn. 
                                                     
92 n 3 above, 369. 
93 ibid, 370. 
94 ibid, 368. 
95 n 5 above, 16-17. 
96 n 3 above, 368. 
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Ellerman and Joskow argue that ‘the effects of the ETS on wholesale and retail 
power prices and generator profitability when the sector was being liberalized were 
not widely understood’.97 This is supported by the fact that no reference to 
potential windfall profits exists in the very comprehensive Green Paper.98  On the 
other hand, greater profitability for low-carbon generators (nuclear, hydro) in 
liberalised markets was expected because wholesale market prices reflect EUA 
values. However, these installations received few or no permits.99   
In addition, not everyone at the commission understood the risk of windfall 
profits. The DG Enterprise and Industry, whose stakeholders are the EIIs, 
remained unaware of this risk until late in the negotiation process. Only through 
piecing together evidence about price interaction with marginal power plants did 
EIIs become aware of windfall profits risks.100  Individual interviews suggest that in 
hindsight, ‘the commission was naïve to not recognize why EURELECTRIC 
supported the ETS’.101 On the other hand, the DG Environment was ‘probably 
aware’ as an official there argues that: 
 
windfall profits were understood from a textbook perspective only. The 
commission did not understand how it worked in practice. For example, 
which firms are price makers or takers and how it would equalize across 
sectors or how liberalization would put a downward pressure on this 
phenomenon […] competitiveness was the most important issue for lobbyists 
in phase one, not windfall profits.102 
 
The DG Energy and Transport was most aware of this risk, because their 
stakeholders are the generators, but all interviewees persist that requiring higher 
auctioning levels for generators ‘was part of the compromise required for 
implementation’.103    
Generators likely understood they would benefit from windfall profits. 
EURELECTRIC carried out ET simulations in 1999 and 2000 where its members 
presumably learned about windfall profits.104 An official at EDF confirms this and 
acknowledges that generators anticipated windfall profits.105 However, another 
official at the same company argues that ‘free allocations were introduced 
primarily to minimize the competitiveness impacts on coal rather than nuclear 
generators’.106 
                                                     
97 n 78 above, 27. 
98 n 70 above, s 7.3.  
99 Egenhofer, n 46 above, 457. 
100 Commission interviews. 
101 ibid. 
102 ibid. 
103 ibid. 
104 Braun, n 22 above, 13. 
105 Industry interview. 
106 ibid. 
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EIIs were not well-organised in phase one.  Markussen and Svendsen draw 
this conclusion as do Engenhofer and Wettestad.107  Wettestad argues that ‘they 
woke up and got their ETS act together’ after phase one, becoming more 
knowledgeable, united and improving their standing within the commission.108 
This is evidenced by their role in establishing and dominating the High Level 
Group109, their active participation in the ECCP110 meetings, and their multi-
targeted lobbying drive in phase three.111 All three activities ensured the 
impossibility of ignoring windfall profits and carbon leakage. In contrast, during 
phase one ECCP meetings, EIIs were uncoordinated and partly disagreed amongst 
themselves. One observer likened it to ‘having slept in class’.112  This conclusion is 
also strengthened by the inability of  EII’s to speak with a single voice in Tables 
Four and Five and the frequency of AEII press releases after Directive One was 
legislated (more than 10 were issued after January 2004 and none before that date). 
113 
ETS phase one was a quick policy-making process guided by the principle of 
implementability where groups with knowledge and experience with ET had 
stronger lobbying power.  After the withdrawal of America from the Kyoto 
Protocol in 2001, the commission embarked on a learning, consultation, and 
implementation sprint to establish the ETS in four years.  This was part of its 
strategy to replace America as climate change policy leader.114 Phase one ECCP 
meetings were dominated by generators because they provided the commission 
with information on how ET worked.115 Officials interviewed at the commission all 
posit that phase one was a trial period; the most important goal was to get things 
                                                     
107 C. Egenhofer, ‘Anxiety Prevails as Windfall Benefits Power Companies’ (European Voice, 2005) at 
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(last visited 20 May 2010); Wettestad, n 5 above, 317; EndsReport, n 81 above. 
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started because it triggers a learning process and institutionalises the regime. 
Avoiding the American fate, where business blocked mandatory carbon regulation, 
was high on policymakers’ minds. 116  Confronting lobby groups on allocation 
methods risked closing the commission’s implementation window. It also would 
have detracted from the herculean tasks of technical forecasting and data 
collection necessary for market creation and to negotiate National Allocation 
Plans.117  
The core of Wilson’s argument is that the distribution of costs and benefits of 
regulation explains levels of rent-seeking.  While ETS phase one had all the 
characteristics of being an example of an interest group battle, it appears from this 
case study that costs and benefits do not operate in a vacuum.  They need to be 
transparently understood, and interest groups also need time to mobilise.  In this 
sense, there are informational costs and transaction costs to collective action that 
provide certain interest groups with lobbying advantages.  These costs can be 
significant and explain why Wilson’s Typology, in its simplest form, does not 
always match the empirical reality. Nevertheless, this insight fits with Wilson’s 
typology if regulatory costs and benefits are conceived of more broadly to include: 
transaction, informational, agency, and collective action costs and benefits. 
Moreover, this ETS case study illustrates how the transactions costs and collective 
action problems which characterize political markets (particularly for disparate 
consumers) also need to be considered for the prima facie wealthy, sophisticated 
and powerful. 
In summary, ETS phase one evidenced very strong characteristics of client 
politics, particularly when Wilson’s conception of regulatory costs and benefits are 
viewed broadly to understand the dynamics of collective action, transaction and 
informational costs that gave generators a lobbying and rent-seeking advantage 
over EIIs. The next section will make the case that phase three corresponds with 
Wilson’s description of interest group politics. 
 
EXPLAINING SHIFTS: CAN REGULATORY FAILURES BE CORRECTED? 
 
ETS phase three can be characterised as interest group politics because the final 
legislation pleased each affected party and resulted from competition between 
active and knowledgeable interest groups that did not face asymmetries in 
collective action and information costs.118 For instance, EURELECTRIC remained 
very active but understood windfall profits would end after phase two although it 
did not endorse auctioning. Instead, its achieved message was that other sectors 
should not unduly benefit from free allocations.119 As in phase one, the process 
was transparent, but this time public opinion clearly sided with EIIs (who were 
                                                     
116 Layzner, n 46 above, 105. 
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better organized, on message and well positioned to influence the commission) 
because global competition risks and public outrage over higher energy prices, 
with corresponding profits, received headlines.120 The level of overall rent-seeking 
in phase three matches interest group politics expectations: auctioning removes 
windfall profits for generators, and the exceptions for facilities in Eastern Europe 
expire in 2020 and use strict benchmarks, while the free-allocations for EIIs also 
characterized by restrictive benchmarks and review clauses.  
At present, the impacts of ET policies are understood by broad constituencies, 
and the first signs of a major shift to entrepreneurial or majoritarian politics are 
appearing. The allocation rules are moving towards optimal policy prescriptions 
which disperse both costs and benefits of regulation by requiring 100 per cent 
auctioning for all sectors by 2027 (Wilson’s majoritarian politics). As such, all 
consumers pay the final costs, and no industry unduly benefits.  Nevertheless, this 
majoritarian equilibrium is taking an entrepreneurial route because, depending on 
which EIIs qualify for free EUAs in phase three and beyond, some may bear the 
complete cost of regulation while all dispersed consumers may benefit from lower 
emissions. The ETS will eventually become majoritarian. However, this prospect is 
likely longer-term because full carbon-cost internalisation (with costs born fully by 
carbon-intensive consumers) is only expected if and when carbon targets tighten 
through 2020 and beyond. Also, future generations (not current cost-bearers) will 
benefit from climate stability if targets are overshot.121  
Other than the greater organisation, cohesion, and resources of EIIs, ETS case 
study facts in phase three match the theoretical explanations for shifts away from 
client politics surveyed in the literature review (see Part Two above).  For example, 
exogenous shifts in the form of global competition raised the profile of carbon 
leakage facing EIIs.122 Indeed, Wettestad argues that windfall profits on their own 
did not justify different allocation rules between industries.123 Rather, it was the 
combination with fears of carbon leakage that facilitated regulatory change.  In 
addition, the importance of auctioning as a policy instrument to remove windfall 
profits may have operated as a ‘force of idea’.124 Elements of client politics’ 
tendency for self-destruction are also visible because high-profile windfall profits 
and resulting higher electricity prices were bound to create a public backlash.  
The ETS case study matches Patashnick’s three conditions for policy reform. 
The first condition, that policy entrepreneurs lower information costs, was present 
in the form of NGOs, EIIs, and the media, who explained the link between prices 
and windfall profits; while consumers also painfully felt the impact of higher 
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electricity prices.125 The second condition, procedural strategies to weaken vested 
interests, existed as new working groups were created with greater weight given to 
EIIs. Finally, the third condition of tactical concessions is seen in the commission’s 
strategy to neutralise ET opposition.  In phase one, it secured the support of the 
largest emitting group, through free permit allocations. In phase three, it 
developed formulas to allocate free EUAs to EIIs and to compensate them for 
higher energy costs. Generators may have also adopted a lose-to-win approach by 
accepting auctioning because they will pass-on EUA costs to consumers and can 
potentially price the lost profits (from no windfall profits).126 This strategy could 
also be motivated by fear of future profit regulation.127 The ETS has clearly 
disrupted traditional coalitional partners and stimulated the emergence of new 
vested interests, for example: the EIIs that benefit from free permits, the 
generators that have invested heavily in abatement and can bank excess permits 
between phases, the specialised businesses that provide carbon market financial 
services and the political constituencies created by ring-fencing auctioning 
revenues for the green economy and adaptation measures.  
In summary, the ETS case study is a rich crucible for developing and 
understanding the dynamics of Wilson’s typology. Not only do the facts 
demonstrate a shift from client to interest group politics and the potential for 
further shifts towards optimal policy prescriptions, but they also highlight the 
importance of informational asymmetry and collective action problems that exist 
in real world of regulatory politics and which Wilson’s Typology, in its classic 
form, overlooks.  This case study also demonstrates the importance of agency by 
political actors to precipitate policy reform that disrupts the status quo. It  
therefore helps breathe life into Wilson’s typology by revealing the dynamism on 
both the interest group and government side of the lobbying game..  Many of 
these insights would be lost if the shift from phase one to phase three were to be 
simply dismissed as attributable to the fact that windfall profits were not widely 
understood and that if they had, interest group politics would have surely emerged 
in phase one (because EIIs would have mobilized earlier); an argument impossible 
to refute because of its counterfactual premise. However, it is precisely because ET 
will be a new untested policy in many jurisdictions that understanding these early 
stage political dynamics is so critical. The next section will consider the broader 
theoretical implications of these insights. 128  
 
THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
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This case study provides evidence for and adds to the sparse literature on 
theoretical explanations for shifts in Wilson’s Typology, particularly shifts from 
client to interest group via entrepreneurial and finally majoritarian politics. It also 
demonstrates an interesting narrative that is testable against other policy reform 
case studies. That is, when new transparent public interest policies are proposed 
with interest group politics potential but majoritarian policy prescriptions, and 
where informational asymmetry (expertise) exists between regulated groups (or 
one group is more instrumental for policy institutionalisation), client  politics is 
likely to emerge. This is likely to occur even if all groups appear to benefit equally 
before the policy is implemented. However, once one group realises that others 
have benefited more, the self-destruction process of client politics triggers a 
counter-mobilisation by losers who, through the competition mechanism that 
interest group politics predicts is very strong, will overcome these asymmetries 
relatively quickly because of the high level of sophistication, power and wealth of 
the major players. Demands for rents in the second round of rule-making will also 
be met by greater resistance. This is because the reform is embedded by having 
already upset existing coalitional patterns and created new vested interests that 
understand the potential for further rent-seeking. Therefore, not only is there a 
return to interest group politics, but also strong indications of a tendency towards 
entrepreneurial or majoritarian politics as the rules begin to resemble optimal 
policy prescriptions.  Table Three illustrates this narrative: 
 
 
 
Table Three: The direction and prospects of optimal policies in Wilson’s 
typology129 
 
Costs of Regulation Benefits of 
Regulation Concentrated Dispersed 
Concentrated Interest Group Politics 
 
 
Client Politics 
 
 
Dispersed Entrepreneurial Politics 
(General Interest) 
 
Majoritarian Politics 
(General Interest) 
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WHAT PROSPECTS FOR PHASE THREE? 
 
It is too early to predict a self-correction from past disorders. The above 
discussion assumes less regulatory failures in phase three; specifically that 
recipients of free permits will not accrue windfall profits. However, existing 
literature that suggests carbon leakage risks are overstated is a serious cause for 
concern.130 A thorough analysis of this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but 
it is worth briefly outlining the debate here.  For example, a report by Oxford 
Economics predicts that moving to 100 per cent auctioning with a carbon price of 
€25/ton will cut EU GDP by 0.5 per cent in the medium to long term.131 A more 
moderate analysis by the Carbon Trust concludes that only cement, steel, and 
aluminium sectors are exposed.132 Others such as the IPCC, Wooders, et al, and 
Mattoo, et al, believe that carbon leakage will only have minimal effects.133 For 
example, Barker, Junankar, et al believe the impacts will be similar to variations in 
exchange rates.134 Indeed Reinaud found no ETS impact on carbon leakage, and a 
recent report by Climate Strategies warns of future regulatory failures with free 
allocations to EIIs.135 Other risks include the economic and political fallout of 
border taxes on the carbon footprints of imports to prevent carbon leakage.136  
Quantifying carbon leakage is challenging, particularly because member states 
will push for protecting domestic industry, and evidence is only certain once 
displacement occurs.137 This is confirmed by the final list of exposed industries, 
which contains more than conservative prescriptions recommend.138 Therefore, 
the risk of windfall profits in phase three has not disappeared; indeed it may have 
increased since the failure to reach a robust international agreement at 
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Copenhagen did not trigger the review clause (of the list) in Article 10(a) of 
Directive Two.139 The debate over windfall profits and carbon leakage is likely to 
intensify in the literature and until an international agreement is concluded, if 
ever.140 A senior official at the commission recognises that carbon leakage is not ‘a 
serious problem, but the process was highly politicized and lobbied. The best can 
be the enemy of the good and sufficient safeguards like strict benchmarking exist 
to minimize problems’. Such pragmatism and optimism in politics is normal. 
However, there is evidence that the benchmarking process currently underway is 
also subject to gaming.141 This is a shame, because the excesses of small powerful 
groups at the expense of wider populations may lead to counter-excess – the 
potential abandonment of a useful regulatory tool (ET) for climate change 
mitigation, in favour of less efficient command and control regulation. 
 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
The ETS case study provides further evidence that it is possible to escape the iron 
clutches of client politics. It instructs policymakers to potential ET regulatory 
failures, particularly in relation to free grandfathered allocations.142 It also provides 
short and long-term strategies for ET institutionalisation and demonstrates the 
prospects for equilibriums at optimal policy prescriptions. However, as already 
noted, if phase three suffers from regulatory failures, the prospects for a rising 
phoenix may be delayed.  
This paper highlights important considerations for American and Australian 
policymakers who are currently negotiating climate change mitigation policies.  
Proposals for ET schemes in these countries have required only 15 per cent and 
~50 per cent auctioning respectively.143  In light of the European experience, the 
American figure may seem very low, but it reflects the necessary payoffs needed 
for long-term institutionalisation and policy learning.144 If the ETS case study is any 
indication, a move towards general interest equilibriums is possible in America and 
Australia if policies can clear the first legislative hurdle of institutionalisation: 
legislation, which at this stage in both countries is uncertain. Indeed America 
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might abandon economy-wide ET entirely in favour of a sectoral approach or no 
approach at all.145 
Finally, the analysis also contributes to the debate about regulatory failures 
and how, from a theoretical perspective, they are manageable by careful selection 
of MBIs.146 The rise of ET was a revolution in European environmental 
governance.147 This upheaval has spread because cost-effective climate mitigation 
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tools are needed by all countries.148 Students of history understand that 
revolutions almost always fail to deliver their promises. Many optimists have 
become ET sceptics because its exposure to rent-seeking may outweigh any 
benefits.149 In light of the result at Copenhagen the prospects for a global carbon 
market are quite bleak, and there have been renewed calls for a carbon tax instead, 
or a hybrid approach (with a carbon tax floor for EUA prices), in part because of 
the high levels of rent-seeking being reported in America and elsewhere.150 
However, the ETS is displaying the green shoots of a restorative order after a 
policy revolution. With rent-seeking potentially resolvable in the medium term, 
academic ink can instead address the major issue of governance and enforceability, 
a more serious ‘Achilles Heel’, if ET can emerge at a global scale.151 This paper has 
therefore shown that the most important policy lesson to be learned from the ETS 
is not only how to reduce regulatory failures, but how to lock-in climate policy. 
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper sought to explain the change in EUA allocation rules between ETS 
phases one and three. It has shown that private interest theories, in addition to 
their multiple weaknesses, struggle to explain policy change without major shifts in 
actors’ interests, particularly at client politics equilibriums. This is why the 
hypothesis approached the question through a different analytical lens – Wilson’s 
Typology – a more universal framework that helps explain policy change beyond 
the EU. The argument defended was that the shift from client politics to interest 
group politics best explains the change in allocation rules between phases one and 
three. 
The ETS case study found evidence of client politics in phase one. This is 
because the failure of EIIs at differentiation and the resulting windfall profits of 
generators match Wilson’s expectations of higher rent-seeking.  Moreover, the 
change in phase three allocation rules — industry differentiation, use of 
benchmarking, higher levels of auctioning, and tight exceptions for EIIs — could 
result in lower rent-seeking, which is consistent with interest group politics 
expectations. Empirically, this shift can be explained by the informational and 
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organisational asymmetry that existed between generators and EIIs which was 
reduced in phase three and facilitated by the agency of a commission and other 
political actors committed to improving the ETS. It is for these reasons that the 
ETS case study provides such a rich crucible for understanding the dynamism in 
Wilson’s Typology and learning how ET can be improved over time. However, one 
limitation remains, it is too early to tell whether carbon leakage rules are overly 
lenient, which may undermine the expectation of long-term optimal policy 
equilibriums characterized by Wilson as majoritarian politics.  
This paper has significant practical, conceptual, and policy implications.  
Practically, it provides one of the first factual analyses of phase three’s final 
directive and the first application of Wilson’s Typology to both ETS legislative 
phases. Conceptually, the ETS case study demonstrates shifts between client and 
interest group politics, an area largely ignored by the literature.  As such, an 
important theoretical lesson can be drawn: information asymmetry between 
lobbying groups during new, complex, and rushed policymaking can force client 
politics outcomes in otherwise interest group scenarios. This empirical reality can 
be reconciled with Wilson’s Typology by understanding his idea of regulatory 
costs and benefits in a broader sense to include: transaction, collective action, and 
informational costs and benefits, applicable even to seemingly sophisticated, 
wealthy and power interest groups. The ETS case study demonstrates that these 
broader costs and benefits apply not only to the disparate consumers, but also to 
the seemingly wealthy, sophisticated and powerful; who can overcome these 
asymmetries relatively quickly when the lobbying game is repeated.  Also, 
integrating policy reform theories can also help breathe life into the classic 
staticism of Wilson’s Typology; evidenced by the agency of the commission and 
other political actors that facilitated a shift from client to interest group politics.  
From a policy perspective, useful lessons can also be drawn about the evolution of 
ET.  Most importantly, this paper identifies a strategy for locking-in climate policy 
and the potential for ET reforms to reach long-term general interest equilibriums 
after false starts. This very preliminary analysis provides a framework that will 
hopefully be validated by future research. Global climate policy could hang in the 
balance. 
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APPENDIX ONE 
 
LOBBYING POSITIONS IN BOTH ETS PHASES 
 
Table Four: Positions of EURELECTRIC and AEIIs in ETS phases one 
and three152 
 
 EURELECTRIC AEIIs 
Phase 
one 
Sector targets: Believe that 
generators should not be the sole 
target  
Enforcement: Favor a voluntary 
cap and trade system 
Allocation: Favor grandfathering 
based on historical emissions by 
member states 
See Table Five 
Phase 
three 
Sector target: Favor all gases and 
sectors. Opposed to excluding 
small installations because of 
market distortions.  
 
Allocation: If increased auctioning 
is inevitable then all sectors should 
be treated equally. Auctioning 
should be harmonised at the EU 
level  
Redistribution of auctioning 
revenues should avoid creating 
market distortions. 
Oppose any allocation that 
discriminates against the electricity 
sector but favor principled 
exceptions (demonstrated by 
robust evidence) for industries at 
risk of carbon leakage until a 
global emission trading regime is 
established. 
 
 
Sector target:  Favor redesigning 
ETS to create an EU and global 
level playing field.  
Support the exclusion of small 
installations. Also favor a sectoral 
and performance-based 
allocation approach for energy 
intensive industries and large 
emitting homogenous processes. 
 
Allocation:  Against auctioning 
for EIIs because of risk of 
carbon leakage. Favor linking 
allocation to ambitious 
benchmarks.  
Criteria for identifying firms that 
qualify should be fair, 
transparent, and objective. 
Qualitative factors should be 
added to Commission Directive two. 
 
 
 
                                                     
152 Source: n 75 above; n 77 above; AEII, ‘Position of Energy Intensive Industries Alliance and the 
Alliance for a Competitive Industry for the EU ETS Review’ (2 December 2008) at 
 http://pr.euractiv.com/node/7388 (last visited 20 May 2010). 
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Electricity prices: Against 
government intervention in 
electricity prices that undermines 
the EU ETS (higher prices) and 
liberalisation process.  Also against 
regulation of electricity generator 
profits and taxation of low-carbon 
generation. 
Electricity prices: Favor 
regulating electricity prices for 
EIIs or offsetting CO2 pass-
through costs using taxation for 
all sectors. 
 
Other:  
Favor abandoning the option of 
reduced-production as a means 
of lowering GHG emissions in 
Europe. Also favor ending 
distortions of the free market 
and preventing further unequal 
treatment for new entrants 
versus incumbents.  
 
 
Table Five: Positions of AEIIs in phase one153 
 
Abbreviations 
ACEA: European Automobile Manufacturers 
CEFIC: The European Chemical Industry Council  
CEMBUREAU: The European Cement Association 
CEPF: Confederation of European Forest Owners 
CEPI: Confederation of European Paper Industry 
CERAMIE-UNIE: The liaison office for the European Ceramic Industry 
CIAA: European Food and Drink Industries 
CPIV: the European Glass Industry 
EEA: European Aluminium Association 
EEF: the British Manufacturers’ Organisation 
EISA: European Independent Steel Works Association 
EULA: European Lime Association 
EUROALLIAGES:  European Ferro-Alloy Industry Association 
EUROFER:  European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries  
EUROMETAUX: Association representing the European non-ferrous metals 
industry 
EUROPIA: European Petroleum Industry Association  
EXCA: European Expanded Clay Industry Association 
IFIEC: International Federation of Industrial Energy Consumers 
 
OGP: International Association of Gas and Oil Producers 
                                                     
153 Source: n 75 above. 
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UNICE:  Union des Industries de la Communauté européenne 
 
AEIIs 
Sector target: 
- UNICE and IFIEC wanted as many sectors and gases to create as much 
flexibility and liquidity as possible  to minimise effects on European and 
international competitiveness 
-EUROPIA and OGP: All sectors 
-EUROFER and EISA: EIASA against ETS, but EUROFER wants all sectors  
-CEPI and CEPF: All sectors and include transport 
-CEMBUREAU and CERAMIE-UNIE: Same sectors should be covered in all 
members states 
-CEFIC: Wanted chemical industry excluded from ETS  
-EUROMETAUX and EEA: Wanted aluminum industry excluded from ETS 
but as many others included 
 
Enforcement:  
- UNICE and IFIEC: The latter wanted voluntary opt-in and out, the former is 
silent 
-EUROPIA and OGP: Voluntary until 2008 no possibility of opt-out 
-EUROFER and EISA: Voluntary 
- CEPI and CEPF: Voluntary  
-CEMBUREAU and CERAMIE-UNIE: Voluntary start in 2005 no possibility 
of opt-out 
-CEFIC: Voluntary 
-EUROMETAUX and EEA: Voluntary with opt-out 
 
Allocation:  
- UNICE and IFIEC: Both unclear but preference for member state allocation 
-EUROPIA and OGP: Free with a preference for Community level oversight 
and guidelines 
- EUROFER and EISA: The former: favor relative targets by benchmarking 
and negotiated agreements at the EU level to avoid competitive distortions. The 
latter: in favor of auctioning 
-CEPI and CEPF: The former: Grandfathering based on common baseline. 
Targets set by negotiation, allocation by member states but with harmonisation 
of rules and compliance at community level.  The latter: not specific. 
-CEMBUREAU and CERAMIE-UNIE: The latter: in favor of auctioning but 
unclear about EU role other than trading should be operational internationally. 
The former: against with EU role in harmonisation 
-CEFIC: Free member state allocation and based on negotiated agreements with 
trade associations  
-EUROMETAUX and EEA: No allowances, instead industry targets should be 
established, unclear on EU role although implicit that sectors means community 
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level 
 
 
COMMISSION PROPOSALS AND DIRECTIVES 
 
Table Six: Phase one comparison of Green Paper and final directive154 
 
 Green Paper Directive One 
Sector 
target  
6 GHG 
 
Feasibility of energy generators 
>50MWth 
 
Iron, steel, minerals, cement, 
pulp and paper, refineries, 
aluminum, chemical 
 
Opt-in and Opt-out (i.e. 
voluntary or mandatory) 
Article 2 (1) and Annex I & II: 
CO2. But other gases if possible 
(Article 24) 
 
Article 2 (1) and Annex I: 
Energy generators >20MWth 
 
Article 2 (1) and Annex I: Iron, 
steel, minerals, cement, pulp and 
paper, refineries.  Aluminum, 
chemical if possible 
 
Article 27: Mandatory. But opt-
in for installations below level in 
directive, temporary opt-out for 
installations  
Initial 
allocation 
For free/grandfathering 
 
Preference for auctioning 
 
Preference for allocation by 
EU  
 
Allocation by MS-EU 
rules/guidelines for allocation 
Article 10: 95% and 90% for 
free in phase one and phase two 
respectively  
 
Article 9: Allocation by 
member states, EU can reject 
according to Internal Market 
Rules and allocation to follow 
Burden Sharing path  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table Seven: Phase three comparison of Commission Proposal Two with 
Directive Two155  
                                                     
154 Source: n 70 above; n 68 above; Markussen and Svendsen, n 6 above, 256. 
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 Commission Proposal Two Directive Two 
Sector targets  New gases: N20 and 
perfluorocarbons 
New sectors: petrochemicals, 
ammonia, aluminum, acid 
(nitric, adipic, glyoxylic) 
Aviation is covered in a 
separate proposal156 
 Excluded small installations 
<25MW and lower than 
10,000 tones of CO2 for each 
of last three years 
Annex I & II 
 Same, but also includes: 
carbon capture, transport 
and geological storage of all 
greenhouse gas emissions 
Aviation included as of 2012 
(Separate Directive157) 
Excluded small installations: 
<35MW and lower than 
25,000 tones each of last 
three years. 
Total level of 
auctioning 
Phase three estimate: 66% 
100% auctioning in all sectors 
by 2020 (with exception for 
industries at risk of carbon 
leakage) 
Phase three estimate: 50% 
100% auctioning in all 
sectors by 2027 (with 
exception for industries at 
risk of carbon leakage) 
Allocation for 
generators 
100% auctioning Article 10 (c) 
Option for Members State 
derogation of 100% 
auctioning if satisfy test: (1) 
level of interconnectivity; or 
(2) % fossil fuel generation. 
Derogations require 
minimum 30% auctioning 
and full auctioning by 2020  
Allocation for 
EIIs 
Free but subject to review 
after Copenhagen COP 15 
 
Article 10 (b) 
Free but subject to review 
after Copenhagen COP 15 
Methodology 
for 
Identification 
of Industries 
at risk of 
Not detailed: 
‘inability to pass through the 
cost of required allowances in 
product prices without 
significant loss of market 
Article 10 (a)  
More detailed:  direct and 
indirect additional 
production costs as a 
proportion of gross value 
                                                                                                                                       
155 Source: n 73 above; n 74 above, n 124 above; Commission (EC), ‘Questions and Answers on the 
Revised EU Emissions Trading System’ (Memorandum) MEMO/08/796, 17 December 2008. 
156 Commission (EC),  ‘Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Include Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse 
Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the Community’ (Communication) COM (2006) 818 final, 20 
December 2006. 
157 Parliament and Council Directive (EC) 2008/101 Amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to Include 
Aviation Activities in the Scheme for Greenhouse Gas Emission Allowance Trading Within the 
Community [2009] OJ L8/3. 
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significant  
carbon 
leakage 
share to installations outside 
the EU not taking 
comparable action to reduce 
emissions’. 
added exceed 5% and 
whether total value of its 
exports and imports divided 
by the total value of its 
turnover exceeds 10%.  If 
the result of either of these 
criteria exceeds 30%, a sector 
is considered at risk of 
significant carbon leakage. 
Compensation 
for electricity 
price pass-
through 
No provision Article 10(a) 
Compensation for costs 
relating to greenhouse gas 
emissions passed through in 
electricity costs.  
This will be subject to 
modified state aide rules. 
Based on ex ante 
benchmarks of electricity 
consumption per unit of 
output based on best 
available technology and 
CO2 emissions of the 
relevant European electricity 
production mix.  
Provisions for 
new market 
entrants 
5% of the total quantity of 
allowance will be put into 
reserve for new installations 
or airlines that enter the 
system after 2013. 
Allocation from this reserve 
will mirror rules for allocation 
corresponding to existing 
installations or sectors 
Remaining allowances will be 
distributed to Member states 
for auctioning.  The 
distribution  key is the same 
as for all other allowances to 
be auctioned. 
Article 10(a) 
Same except: 
A part of new entrant 
reserve, amounting to 300 
million allowances will be 
made available to support 
the investments in up to 12 
demonstration projects using 
the carbon capture and 
storage technology and 
demonstration projects using 
innovative renewable energy 
technologies. 
Remaining allowance 
distribution will take into 
account the level to which 
installations in Member 
states benefited from the 
reserve. 
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INTERVIEWS  
 
Industry 
Interview 1: Representative of the Bryman Partnership: Business & Environmental 
Consultancy, representing the Confederation of Paper Industries at the UK 
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Emissions Trading Group, 10 July 2009: 14:00, London, and 20 December 2009: 
17:00, London. 
 
Interview 2: Representative of the Environmental Analyst Team, British Energy, 5 
June 2009: 17:00, London. 
 
Interview 3: Executive at EDF Energy, 5 June 2009: 16:30, London. 
 
Interview 4: Representative for Strategy and Sustainable Development, EDF 
Energy, 5 June 2009: 17:15, London. 
 
Interview 5: Representative of EEF: the Manufacturers' Organisation, 4 August 
2009: 10:00, London. 
 
Commission 
Interview 1: Senior official at the Directorate-General for the Environment, 
European Commission, 5 June 2009: 11:30, London. 
 
Interview 2: Official at Directorate B - Industrial Policy and Economic Reform: 
Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry, European Commission, 2 June 
2009: 09:00, Brussels. 
 
Interview 3: Official at Unit for market based instruments including Greenhouse 
gas emissions trading: Directorate-General for the Environment, European 
Commission, 2 June 2009: 14:30, Brussels. 
 
Interview 4: Official at Unit A1 Economic Analysis, Impact Assessment, 
Evaluation and Climate Change: Directorate General Energy and Transport, 
European Commission, 2 July 2009: 09:00, Brussels. 
